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Concerns exist among field level commercial activities 
(CA) program managers. This poses a threat to proper imple-
mentation of the CA program. The concerns are manifested in 
a poorly managed command CA program. This study examines 
the allegations of bias in CA program policy structure 
towards the elimination of federal employees from Department 
of Defense commercial activities. The feasibility of a 
federal incentive system to improve overall program 
efficiency and management is discussed. Other areas of 
interest addressed are individual role perceptions and 
responsibilities; OPNAV relationships; and the mechanics of 
program operations. The study concludes that the Navy's CA 
policy needs to provide a greater degree of equity in its 
treatment of both the federal managers and the affected 
civilian employees in CA activities. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. GENERAL COMMENTS 
The Chief o f Naval Operations (OPNAV-443B) acts as the 
primary point of contact for commercial/indust rial activity 
(CA) matters of interest to the Navy Secretariat, Office of 
Secretary of Defense, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
and Congress. Policy regarding the per formance of the 
United States Government's CA program has been established 
through the implementation of OMB Circular A-76 and is 
delineated to United States Navy Policy v i a OPNAV Instruc-
tion 4860.7B. 
This basic policy states "the federal government should 
not start or carry on any commercial activities to provide 
services or product for its own use if such products or 
services can be obtained from pri vate enterprises through 
ordinary channel s." (Ref. l:pp. 1-2] Budgetary constraints 
in the federal government have reemphas ized the apparent 
need for increased competition in the treatment and award of 
commercial act ivities performed for the government. The 
effect of cost savings through competition o f this nature is 
well documented and substantial, but the e f fective applica-
tion of current commercial activity pol icies has been 
questioned. 
6 
B. AREA OF RESEARCH 
The thesis will examine the expressed concerns of 
field/command level CA program managers and their staffs 
when implementing the U.S. Navy's CA program. Research will 
study field level perceptions of CA program goals and the 
policy guidelines established for CA managers to meet those 
goals. 
Areas to be explored are allegations of bias in CA 
program policy structure towards the elimination of federal 
employee performance of non-inherently governmental commer-
cial activities. Accusations of inequity in the perform-
ance of CA reviews and alternative methods of conducting CA 
reviews will be presented. 
Disruptive forces confront a command when it is required 
to perform a CA study. Federal and Navy instructions do not 
consider the inability of individual commands to implement 
the CA program without outside resource assistance. The 
current lack of resource support for commands which are 
required to establish a commercial activities organization 
could lead to the delay of the final contract award 
determination or reduce the effectiveness of the activity to 
perform its original mission. 
Because of the emphasis on cost savings in government, 
the CA program is a timely issue; and it is an issue (com-
mercial activities) that has saved millions of tax dollars 
to date. It must continue to be explored and improved. 
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C. SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
The thes i s wi ll focus on problems associated with U.S. 
Navy policy within a federally mandated commercial/indus-
trial activiti es program. The thesis search for information 
was limited to Naval commands in the Monter ey Peninsula and 
San Francisco Bay areas . A limited number o f completed com-
mercial act i v i t y studies were screened to r eview the impact 
of long-term commercial activity p r ojects on an 
organization. Personnel from six commands were interviewed 
for determinations, findings and problems associated with 
commercial activi ties program implementation . 
The approach to the topic was limited to the i mpact or 
effect of the CA program, as designed t hrough navy and 
federa l policy, o~ t he host command. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION: What probl ems develop within 
field level CA program staffs when implementing the Navy CA 
program? 
SUBSIDIARY QUESTIONS: 
a. What is the role of the field level CA program manager 
in implementing the Navy CA program? 
b. Is the goal of the Navy CA program t o maximize effi-
ciency in activity performance or to enhance the 
opportunity of private industry to ga i n government CA 
contracts? 
c. Have adequate lines o f communication been established 
between the formulators of program policy and field 
level personnel responsible f or program 
implementation? 
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d. Are accusations of inequity in the treatment of 
federal employees within the government's CA program 
justified? 
E. DISCUSSION 
The people within an organization affect its structure. 
The abilities and attitudes of managers, their need to work 
with each other must be taken into account when implementing 
a program with the scope of the Navy's CA program. 
The primary measure of success for any large scale 
program of this nature is the cost savings the program 
generates. Concurrent to this success is the confidence and 
stability the program projects to the personnel who 
implement it. 
The role of the government in the performance of commer-
cial activities is presented clearly by the Chief of Naval 
Operations: 
In the process of governing, the government should not 
compete with its citizens. The competitive enterprise 
system, characterized by individual freedom and initia-
tive, is the primary source of national economic strength. 
In recognition of this principle, it has been and con-
tinues to be the general policy of the government to rely 
on commercial sources to supply the products and services 
the government needs. (Ref. 2:p. 1-1] 
But in reviewing the Navy's instructional definition of 
a commercial/industrial activity, it is also presented 
clearly that performance is not limited to private industry: 
A commercial activity is a function either contracted 
or operated by a Navy field or headquarter's activity that 
provides a product or service obtainable from a commercial 
source. A CA can be identified with an organization or as 
a type of work, but must be: 
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(a) separable from other functions so as to be suit-
-able for performance either in-house or by 
contract. 
(b) a regularly needed activity of an operational 
nature, not a one-time activity of short duration 
associated with support of a particular project. 
It is this distinction of CA performance by either 
government (in-house) or private industry contract that 
raises questions about current CA policy relative to the 
federal workforce who must implement the program. 
Failure to address these questions will lead to 
continued communication barriers within the program. As a 
result of these barriers, gamesmanship develops among 
program participants, program credibility is diminished, 
employee involvement is reduced and program resource costs 
are increased. The research examines these questions raised 
by federal employees. This type of examination may produce 
a more equitable and coordinated CA program . 
F. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Preliminary research included a review of the history of 
commercial/industrial activi ty (CA) programs, and a review 
of the policies surrounding the generation of program guide-
lines. Reviews of Congressional Hearings were performed to 
provide further background and to better substantiate the 
intent of the program requirements. Existing regulations, 
instructions, policy guidance letters and current periodi-
cals were researched. 
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Initial discussions were held with the Office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations (443-B). Subsequent fact finding 
sessions were held at field level activities to gather 
information on CA post award management. CA program 
managers were interviewed to determine problem areas asso-
ciated with program implementation and resource utilization. 
G. DEFINITIONS 
1. Commercial Activity: An activity which is either 
contracted or operated and managed by federal execu-
tive agency and which provides a product or service 
that could be obtained from private sources. It must 
2 . 
be separable from other functions so as to be 
suitable for performance either in-house or by 
contract; and a regularly needed activity of an 
operational nature, not a one time activity of 
short duration. (Ref. 1:p. 2] 
Governmental Function: 
formed in-house due to 
executing governmental 
include: 
A function that must be per-
the intrinsic relationship in 
responsibilities. Examples 
a. Discretionary exercise of government authority 
such as judicial functions, management of govern-
ment programs requiring value judgment, conduct of 
foreign relations, management and direction of the 
armed services, etc. (Ref. 1:p. 2] 
b. Monetary transaction and entitlements such as tax 
collection and revenue disbursements. (Ref. 1:p. 
3] 
3. Manaaement Study: An internal management review per-
formance by the government to determine the most effi-
cient organization (MEO) . 
4. Most Efficient Organization CMEO) : The result of a 
management study for determining an organization's 
most efficient and effective personnel structure. The 
study utilizes descriptions of functions being 
performed and the staff involved. Specific sugges-
tions on ways to improve efficiency and effectiveness 
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are obtained from managers, supervisors and employees 
associated with the function under study. 
5. Performance Work Statement CPWS): Specification or 
description that describes output requirements of the 
government. It should also describe personnel respon-
sibilities, facility/equipment requirements, perform-
ance standards and quality assurance plans to insure 
performance by either the government or the commercial 
vendor. [Ref. 3 :p. III-1] 
6. Private , Commercial Source: A privat e business, uni-
versity , or other non-federal act i vity located in 
the United States, its territories and possessions, or 
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico that provides a com-
mercial product or service required by government 
agencies. [Ref. 2:p. I-3] 
7. Cost Comoarison COr Cost Comoarison Analysis): An 
accurate determination of whether it is more economi-
cal to acquire the needed products or services from a 
private , commercial source or from existing or pro-
posed government managed CA. The term "CA study" is 
often used interchangeably wi th the term "cost compar-
ison a nalys is." [Ref. 2:p. I -3] 
8. Saved Pay : An entitlement preventing civil service 
employees from incurring a reduction in their current 
pay levels for a 2 year period. 
H. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The organi zation of this thesis is formatted such that 
the reader can logically follow the devel opment of lessons 
learned from the experience of field level personnel 
managing the Navy's CA program. The thes is begins with the 
historical background of the CA program and leads to 
definitive field level problems associated with program 
implementation guidelines. Determinations of program 
accuracy and problem diagnosis are followed by recommenda-
tions for resolution, if applicable. Conclusions address 
some arguments for program improvements. 
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Chapter II presents an historical overview of the 
development of the CA program and synopsizes the scope of 
the Navy's CA program. The current status of the program is 
described, mechanics of program operations and the field 
level policies found within field CA program staffs are 
discussed. 
Chapter III presents the various problems found within 
field level CA program offices relative to current CA 
policy. Areas of interest are individual role responsibili-
ties, OPNAV relationships and private industry bias. 
Chapter IV examines the specifics of equity in the 
treatment of the federal employee and discusses the 
feasibility of a federal incentive system to improve overall 
program efficiency and management. 
Chapter V summarizes the key issues, problems and trends 
in implementing the Navy's CA program. Recommendations for 
instruction and program improvements are given as well as an 
overview of thesis research techniques, points of contact 
and areas of future research. 
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II . FRAMEWORK AND BACKGROUND 
A. GENERAL 
President Reagan campaigned on a promise to cut the size 
of government and has utilized OMB Cir cular A-76 and 
associated agency CA programs to assist in t his effort. The 
goal of the Navy ' s CA program is to find the most economical 
and efficient method of providing gover nment services. 
Whenever it seems feasible that government s ervices could be 
provided by the private sector, the Navy's CA program 
instructi ons set out guidelines and procedures to allow a 
cost comparison between the government and private industry 
contractors. The CA program, therefore, starts with the 
assumption that the competitive marketplace is usually the 
best way to ach i eve efficiency. Yet, ser i ous reservations 
about the wisdom of CA program pol i cy e xists within the 
workforce which is required to carry out those policies. 
What may add up to adequate cost savings at policy-making 
levels can appear far less economical when c onsidered at the 
local working level. 
Perceived adequat e levels of cost savings in terms of 
dollars may fai l to reflect disruptions caused by reductions 
in the federal workforce. The expected c ost savings are 




agencies due to shifting in the federal 
In summary, the author believes an analysis of current 
CA program practices is advantageous to the future success 
and development of the commercial/industrial activities 
program. The analysis should bring to light the practices 
that cause inequities among the federal workforce. 
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The House of Representatives appointed a special commit-
tee in 1932 to investigate government competition with 
private enterprise. This committee expressed the initial 
concerns over the extent to which the government was engaged 
in activities that could be performed in the private sector. 
The first and second Hoover Commissions expressed 
similar concerns and recommended legislation to prohibit 
government competition with private enterprise. Several 
congressional bills introducing this prohibition were 
forwarded, but all action was dropped upon assurance from 
the executive branch that the policy was being implemented 
administratively. Bureau of the Budget (BOB) Bulletin 55-4 
issued on January 15, 1955 announced the general policy that 
the "federal government will not start or carry on any 
commercial activity to provide a service or product for its 
own use 
private 
if such product or 
enterprise through 
[Ref . 4 : p . 12 7 ] 
service can be procured from 
ordinary business channels." 
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This was followed by BOB Bulletin 57-7 and Bulletin 
60-2. The latter bulletin was the first to qualify 
continuation of government operations if procurement through 
commercial sources would involve higher costs. These costs 
between private industry and government were to be compared. 
Differences had to be substantial and disproportionate to 
authorize government continuation of the CA . 
In March 1966, the first OMB Circular A-76 was issued. 
President Johnson in his memorandum to the heads of 
departments and agencies stated: "We must seek in every 
feasible way to reduce the cost of carrying out government 
programs." 
The circul ar was revised in 1967 to provide additional 
guidance in determining cost procedures, but no substantive 
changes were made. 
The General Accounting Office (GAO) , 
1972, concluded that implementation of 
during 1971 and 
this policy by 
executive agencies was not effective and was resulting in 
continuing conflict and controversy. [Ref. 4:p. 128] 
The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) was 
created by Public Law 93-400 in August of 1974 in response 
to the first recommendation of the Congressional Commission 
on Government Procurement. One of the major 
responsibilities assigned to OFPP was implementation of the 
A-76 policy. Agencies were required to update their 
implementing instructions, report on progress and justify 
16 
decisions between contract and in-house performance. The 
-
OFPP initiative was met by resistance from federal employee 
groups, reluctance by federal agencies and some expressions 
of concern by members of congress. 
The continuing controversy, fueled by an increased use 
of the circular in the Department of Defense, forced a com-
prehensive review of the circular, beginning in 1977. As a 
result of the comments received, a complete revision of the 
circular was issued in March 1979. That revision reconfirm-
ed the general policy of reliance on the private sector, 
while recognizing that some functions must be performed by 
government personnel. 
For the first time, the basic concept of A-76 began to 
change to recognize the equity and value of having federal 
workers compete for the jobs they were holding. Improved 
productivity through competition, in effect, became the 
policy. 
In 1981, OMB Director Stockman announced that OMB would 
begin a comprehensive reexamination of the cost comparison 
methodology to streamline it and make it as efficient as 
possible. Revisions were made to the A-76 circular to 
facilitate better understanding of the procedures, 
streamline the cost comparison methodology, and ensure 
equity. After a lengthy and thorough review period, a 
revised circular was issued on August 4, 1983. 
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In summary, the CA policy began as a protective measure 
for industry to control the size of government. However, it 
evolved into a cost saving device to measure the efficiency 
of government operations. 
Currently, the CA process is very complex and time-
consuming. As a result, few people understand the process 
and there is a resistance to fully implement the policy. 
C. CURRENT CA PROGRAM STATUS 
1. Definition of CA Policy 
Some functions are inherently governmental in nature 
and must be performed by in-house (government) personnel. 
An example of this type of function are the positions 
covered by the Nuclear Weapon Personnel Rel i ability Program, 
which are considered Governmental in the Navy. Research, 
development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) functions are also 
exempted by law . This exemption applies to direct RDT&E 
effort and does not include RDT&E support . Other functions, 
such as automated data processing (ADP) services, may be 
done by commercial sources but for reasons of national 
interest are performed by in-house personnel. These types 
of unique CA's are considered on a case-by-case basis. 
Still other funct ions can be performed equal l y well by in-
house or private enterprise, and the determining factor in 
these instances is the least cost in a cost comparison study 
and a bid process. [Ref. 2:pp. 2-1, 2-2] 
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In performing a cost 
competes with private enterprise. 
formance work statement (PWS) 
comparison the Government 
The development of a per-
is critical to the cost 
comparison process. It ensures that Government and commer-
cial sources bid on the same scope of work. The design of a 
PWS is based on a systematic analysis of the function to be 
put under contract or already under contract. 
consists of a step-by-step review of the 
The procedure 
requirement to 
arrive at the specific output services and associated 
standards. Federal guidelines require "the most qualified 
persons available to write the PWS." [Ref. S:p. 5] This 
requirement does not differentiate as to whether those 
persons should be from management or activity personnel who 
perform the tasks. This process of PWS development enables 
CA managers to pull together all of the essential 
information needed to state accurately a function's minimum 
required outputs. Examples of these functions could be 
vehicle maintenance, food service or refuse collection. 
PWS 's also help to build a foundation that will help the 
Government determine the quality of the contractors or in-
house service. The starting point in looking at a service 
function is to see how it is organized and what kind of 
service or outputs it provides. This is not to say that the 
PWS will require that a contractor adopt the Government 
style of organization. Rather, "PWS's will provide a 
framework for determining what is done by the organization." 
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[Ref. 5:p. 17] These PWS's become the bas i s for development 
of standards , defining performance indicators, and 
identifying acceptable quality levels of performance. 
Firm b i d or negotiated procurement procedures are 
utilized during the cost comparison process. Government 
contracting personnel closely monitor and regulate the 
costing procedure to ensure federal contracting guidelines 
are met. Upon conclusion of the cost comparison, the 
process is val idated by the Naval Audit Service and award is 
made to the lowest bidder. 
All functions approved for continuation in-house are 
to be reviewed every five years. When military billets are 
included in CA functions, they are either exempted by CNO 
for military purposes, such as mobilizat ion or training 
requirements, or converted to civilian posit ions. 
D. CURRENT FIELD LEVEL POLICIES 
Research indicates that the typical i ndividual field 
level commands base their current CA policy on reaching the 
following two (2 ) goals. 
1. Obtain exemJtion from performing a formal cost 
comparison on all CA's, if possible . 
2. If CA studi es are directed, make every effort to 
retain the function in-house. 
Individual commands are attempting to r educe command CA 
studies through establishment of core capabi lities, mission-
related responsib ilities and other compel l ing reason code 
exemptions. 
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These efforts to resist meeting the program's primary 
-
goals of efficiency and fairness lead to misconceptions and 
accusations within field level commands by affected workers. 
A generalized listing of areas relating to these misconcep-
tions and accusations are: 
1. Inaccurate interpretations or perceptions 
goals compared with the working program 
provided to field level personnel. 
of program 
guidelines 
2. Inadequate field level resources 
performance of a creditable CA study. 
necessary for 
3. Failure to define 
coordinators. 
the role of command CA 
4. Program inequities 
employees. 
in the treatment of federal 
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I I I. CA MANAGERS AND STAFFS 
A. INTRODUCTI ON 
The overridi ng precept for the ou tcome of all CA 
contract awards i s that the CA function will be performed in 
the manner most economical to the government , regardless of 
source (i.e . , i n-house vs. contractor ) . 
The policy o f the United States Navy in establishing 
their commercial/industrial activities program states that 
"the Navy will depend on both government and commercial 
sources to provide necessary products and s ervices with the 
objective of meet ing military readiness r equirements with 
maximum cost eff ectiveness" [Ref. 2:p. 1-5] . 
Within f ield level activities, all commanding officers 
are required to "appoint a CA program manage r to monitor and 
coordinate the operation of the commands CA program" [Ref. 
2: p. 1-9]. These managers are responsible for the imple-
mentation of t he Navy policy just discussed. Managers may 
be either mi l i tary or civilian. Dependent upon the number 
and scope o f CA's present within commands, CA managers may 
be appointed ful l time or in a collateral dut y capacity. 
Research i n this chapter has sought to determine what 
field level problems are associated with managing and 
implementing the Navy's CA program within the context of 
individual command CA managers. 
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B. ROLE OF THE PROGRAM MANAGER 
Military instructions and agency circulars provide CA 
managers with basic policy for the performance of their 
responsibilities. Their knowledge of program requirements 
for the completion of cost studies is adequate yet they 
differ as to what role to assume within their respective 
host commands. The following three (3) roles are generally 
found within field CA offices. 
1. In-House Manager 
In-house CA program managers felt they should be 
firm in maintaining the in-house responsibility for CA 
performance. The PWS, MEO and overall management study is 
sometimes manipulated to allow the host command and its 
federal employees to retain the function in-house. In-house 
CA program managers believe their staffs should work within 
program guidelines at all costs to ensure the retention of 
CA functions in-house. 
2. Objective Manager 
These CA program managers perceive their role within 
the CA program as being one of strict obj ecti vi ty. They 
should not have personal concern for reductions in force 
(RIF) , personnel transfers or the downgrading of civil 
service positions. 
and civil service 
Believing in the adequacy of CA program 
methods of employee redress, this CA 
manager divorces himself from overt employee concerns, 
working strictly within the guidelines presented for PWS, 
23 
MEO and cost development. Loyalty is neither to the host 
command, the activity under study or contract performance by 
private industry. 
3. Contracting Out Manager 
This CA program manager interprets the mandate of 
performance as one of ensuring the accuracy of the in-house 
bid. It is this manager's responsibility to see that the 
PWS and MEO includes all required taskings as well as 
adequate levels of activity staffing in terms of workforce 
and quality assurance assignments. They interpret the CA 
program manager's role as overseer of the government to 
prevent the underestimation of the in-house bid. They 
perceive the Navy-wide CA program goal as an eventual shift 
of CA performance to private industry. 
These three varieties of outlooks towards the CA 
program distorts the collective effort of the personnel in 
program offices assigned to implement the program at the 
field level. CA program managers want to have their roles 
more specifically defined. The individual s and staffs 
responsible for PWS/MEO development and the entire 
management study package should not have to make grossly 




C. RESOURCE CONFLICTS 
1. Small Command CA Manager 
Small commands and field level installations are 
rarely provided direct 
management study efforts. 
commands are assigned to 
generally as collateral 
resource assistance in their 
CA responsibilities within these 
military and civilian employees 
duties. Predisposed to primary 
duties, these individuals are often unfamiliar with the CA 
program, lack work experience in CA operations, and must 
rely on the employees currently performing the activity for 
assistance. 
This lack of experience, coupled with reliance on 
fellow command employees, bias the role of the CA manager. 
Degradation of the in-house management study results from 
these associations. Time consumption, primary duties, 
employee hostility, lack of cooperation and the vast scope 
of PWS/MEO development contribute to a low quality output 
from the CA program manager who is assigned the position as 
a collateral duty. 
2 . Large Command CA Manager 
Larger commands (public works, supply centers, etc.) 
maintain a large federal/military workforce and multi-
million dollar CA contracts. As a result, CA managers are 
assigned on a full time basis, rather than as a collateral 
duty. However, these managers can have a problem 
interpreting their role. They can decide that they are any 
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one of the three types of CA managers addressed in Section B 
-
of this chapter . 
Specifici ty in the role of the fulltime CA manager 
is crucial. Program direction must be defined as either 
working for in-house retention, objectivi ty, or eventual 
civilian sector perf ormance. This definition is essential 
for efficiency and program cohesiveness . Role definition 
decisions should not be made by individual commands. The 
formulators of CA po l icy must evaluate , determine and 
publish the over all program direction. Forthrightness in 
program policy a nd role assignments at a l l levels of the 
command CA organization will alleviate the following 
historical areas of field concerns: 
1. Eliminate the perceptions of in-house vs. contractor 
bias or vice versa in the development of in-house 
management studies. 
2. Provide c l ear expectations as t o what federal 
employees and CA program staffs can achieve through 
efficient management study efforts. 
3. Provide continuity in management study performance 
between commands with CA's of similar nature (i.e., 
refuse c ol l ect i on) . 
4. Reduce perf ormance time and management study costs. 
5. Increase the quality and efficiency in management 
studies. 
D. OPNAV 
The majority of field level CA p r ogram managers 
interviewed held negative perceptions of the program policy 
makers within the OPNAV organization. The CA managers felt 
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there was a lack of receptiveness from policy makers in 
their efforts to retain CA's in-house by increasing 
efficiency. Any effort to re-establish in-house responsi-
bilities for a CA, once it has been awarded to private 
industry, would ultimately always be denied. Associated 
with this belief is, again, the failure to define the role 
responsibility of CA program offices. 
Confusion in the responsibilities of CA program managers 
at individual commands degrades the cooperative efforts of 
these managers. CA managers can improve the CA program 
through their interaction to standardize the methods of 
developing PWS's and MEO's. 
The CA manager working to gain efficiency for in-house 
performance see the efforts as futile if the perception of 
the CA program goal is to lose CA's to private industry. 
Program offices that have an unbiased attitude towards 
either government or private CA performance do not provide 
an adequate competitive foundation for cost comparisons. 
Competition exists when the goals of each party is 
incompatible. Within the CA program, competition is based 
on two parties (government and private industry) competing 
for performance of a single CA. Federal program offices 
which maintain an unbiased attitude as to which party 
succeeds in gaining performance is not providing a competi-
tive environment. 
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E. A CONTRACTING OUT PROGRAM 
The majority of field level CA program managers believe 
that the intent of the A-76/CA program is to assure private 
industry perf ormance of all non-inherently governmental 
CA 1 s. This belief is based primarily on two fundamental 
weaknesses of t h e program. 
1. Five Year Review Requirement 
Chief of Naval Operations Inst ruction 4860.7B 
requires a complete review of all Navy CA 1 s by 30 September 
1987 [Ref. 2 : p. 3-1 ] . Functions approved for continuation 
via in-house (government performance) are required to be 
reviewed and recompeted with private industry every five 
years after an i nitial 30 September 1987 review. No such 
requirement exists for contracted out CA 1 s. Due to this 
requirement CA program managers believe t h e 
biased in favor of private industry and will 
program is 
lead to the 
eventual loss of all CA 1 s to the civilian s e ctor. It is the 
contention that regardless of the efficienc y in performance 
that in-house functions gain from their i n i tial reviews and 
successes in prev ious cost comparisons, re- competition with 
private industry is mandate'd every five yea rs. This policy 
allows inequitabl e treatment of in-house capabilities. CA 
contracts awarded to private industry which experience 
unsatisfactory performance 
only an "informal review" 
or unacceptable costs require 
of in-house capabilities to 




ability to perform previously awarded CA's occurs after 
remedial action fails to improve contractor performance. 
Re-solicitation with private industry is initiated if the 
remedial action failed to solve the poor performance of the 
initial contractor. The informal review of in-house capa-
bilities to perform the CA then occurs if re-solicitation 
does not produce the cost efficiency desired in contractor 
performance of the CA. 
Because of the lack of remedial measures and self-
help alternatives in terms of review procedures, government 
employees and CA managers believe that the overall program 
is predisposed to favor contracting out to private industry. 
2. Command Structure 
Contracts performed by the civilian sector that are 
terminated for default due to performance or cost are 
offered to the next lowest responsible and responsive 
bidder, after validation of contract wage rates. If the 
government is the next lowest bidder, the function may be 
returned to in-house performance "if still feasible" [Ref. 
3: p. I-3]. Navy policy in offering this option fails to 
address the loss of command structure that occurs upon 
conversion of a CA to private industry performance. Right 
of displaced federal employees to a first refusal of con-
tractor positions and government placement programs for 
affected employees, eliminates the federal structure to 
allow for a return to in-house performance of the function. 
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The time require~ for rehiring and restructuring the in-
house capability as well as loss of "corporate knowledge" 
precludes the fair competition with private industry that 
the program tries to dictate. 
F. COMPELLING REASON CODES 
CA managers abuse the application of Compelling Reason 
Codes while they are simultaneously criticizing the CA 
program for lack of definition and bias. Compelling reason 
codes are designed to streamline the inventory recognition 
of all CA' s performed in service to the government. The 
codes are utilized to break down CA's into identifiable 
categories for purposes of assigning exemptions and for 
determining the cost comparison status of specific CA's. 
Within field level commands and activities, Compelling 
Reason Codes are regarded as a primary tool to avoid the 
requirement to perform a CA. Managers view the ability to 
gain favorable Compelling Reason Code assignments from OPNAV 
as an important defensive tactic. Considerable time, effort 
and resources are utilized by CA managers and staffs in this 




IV. LABOR RELATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The cost comparison process requires CA program managers 
to work intimately with key personnel involved in the CA to 
be studied. Familiarity with the mission and functional 
requirements of the activity that is to undergo a cost 
comparison is required in order to adequately develop 
performance work statements and the associated management 
study used in producing the most efficient organization. 
The ability to derive the measures of an activity's 
outputs keys on the cooperation of the federal employees who 
are actually performing the activity. Lack of cooperation 
by the employees and the failure to recognize their con-
cerns in implementing the CA program results in inefficien-
cies. These inefficiencies can occur in construction of the 
PWS, the MEO and even the cost analysis. They are 
manifested as poor motivation, dissent within the host 
command. They degrade the fairness of the overall CA 
program. 
This chapter centers on the concerns found among the CA 




The overall personnel policies of an organization, and 
its methods for rewarding individual employees translates 
into actions that influence and motivate workers. 
The CA program stresses efficiency as the criterion for 
contract award but the CA program fails to provide adequate 
mechanisms for encouraging in-house performance efficiency. 
Program managers perceive this lack of encouragement as a 
further step in the effort to contract out CA's to private 
industry. This failure also affects actual CA performance 
and the in-house bid development. Superior performance must 
be recognized as essential to the maintenance and sustenance 
of efficient in-house performance. 
The CA functional departments management and the CA 
program staffs at field level activities dedicate time and 
resources to the establishment of an effective in-house 
organization. The benefits received from this effort are 
perceived as non-existent. The federal worker views occupa-
tional stability and recognition of service as civil 
service's primary benefits. Current CA program guidelines 
leaves the federal employee, who participates in PWS/MEO 
development and achieves efficiency, with only a tentative 
hold on his current position. That tentative hold is only 
maintained if the competition results in continued 
government performance. Efforts at efficiency that do not 
result in the government maintaining CA performance places 
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the federal employee in a position of having to choose from 
-
the following options: 
a. Leave government 
employment. 
service for private sector 
b. Transfer to other available governmental positions. 
c. Retire, if eligible. 
These options are not rewards to the federal employee 
for superior effort and efficient performance but penalties. 
Shifting to private industry may lead to a reduction in pay 
and benefits. Transfers within government billets are 
disruptive, costly and can result in the employee having to 
accept civil service grade reductions to remain in the same 
geographic area. Early employee retirements based on CA 
study results provide no benefit to the government, reduces 
an individual's effective work-life and should not be 
encouraged. 
The reward system of any program can have a great impact 
on performance, morale and efficiency. The reward or 
compensation must justify the extra effort required for 
improved performance. The reward must be directly 
associated with that improved performance so that it is 
clear why the reward has been given. Within the Navy CA 
program, an incentive system to encourage federal worker's 
cooperation is absolutely necessary. However, the CA 
program, as it operates now, offers only negative incentive 
or reward. 
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1. In-House Review Requirement 
Review requirements for CA' s 
performed in-house 
review [Ref. 2: pp. 
are limited 
1-10] . The 
to a one 
review is 
currently being 
time, one year 
conducted after 
completion of the first year of CA performance. It is 
performed for determining the adequacy of i n-house capabili-
ties to meet its award winning bid and perfo rmance criteria. 
Although mandated through Navy instructions, it is strictly 
for in-house consumption, never leaving t h e host command. 
Higher authority does not recognize and monitor in-house 
performance with the same scrutiny given to contractual 
performance. CA program managers view this position as an 
indicator of t he overall program goal to transfer 
performance of all non-inherently governmental CA's to 
private industry. An annual statement of certification 
(Figure 4 .1), submitted to OPNAV, could be instituted to 
insure adequate monitori ng for sustained levels of in-house 
cost and performance , at or below bid levels . 
It i s diffi cult to measure the performance of 
indivi dual empl oyees accurately, especia lly when their 
outputs not d i rectly quantifiable, as is t rue for many CA 
funct i ons. OPNAV should require the host command to 
annually moni tor and submit in-house MEO costs and 
performance data and compare it against their award winning 
bid. Through this submission OPNAV would be able to 
maintain a measure of efficiency of in-house performance. 
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Program managers want to motivat e employees to 
higher levels of performance, loyalty , commitment and 
stability. Job security acts as an incentive measure for 
efficient performance . One way to motivate efficiency 
through job security is to allow an in-house functional 
group that has won a competition over priv a t e industry a ten 
year vice a five year review cycle before a recompetition 
with private i ndustry. 
Performance work statement (PWS) a nd most efficient 
organization (MEO ) development would be greatly enhanced by 
incentivizing af f ected employees to provide more efficient, 
well standardized PWS' s. Requirements f or conducting an 
ambitious five (5) year review cycle could be removed, thus 
generating savings in terms of command resources. Reduc-
tions i n host command time, manpower and funding would be a 
benefit to the overall cost savings of the program with the 
removal of this review requirement. OPNAV would be provided 
a more effici ent timeframe to conduct audit and review 
services of management study submissions, which would 
standardize the Navy-wide CA policy for conducting these 
studies . 
Instituting a non-monetary incent i ve system would 
allevi ate the CA program from current allegations of unfair-
ness to the federal employee. True competition with private 
industry would be initiated with both sides actively in-
volved, at all levels, in providing the greatest efficiency 
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in performance of the commercial activity. Definitive roles 
-
would be established within CA program offices Navy-wide and 
result in greater cooperation in sharing improved PWS and 
MEO development techniques. 
An incentive system would not constitute a policy 
shift away from the fair privatization of non-inherently 
governmental CA's. In-house failures to meet PWS, MEO and 
bid parameters would constitute grounds for civilian sector 
performance based on the next lowest bid. Private contrac-
tors remain in a superior position compared to the govern-
ment to maintain, develop and deploy a CA organization. 
Significant changes in the scope of a CA function would also 
allow for the competitive contracting cycle to begin. The 
in-house CA program office would act as a catalyst and 
partner in fair, efficient competition with private 
industry. 
In summary, an incentive system would generate 
increased savings in dollars to the government. These 
savings would result from intensified competition, 
reductions in resource usage, reduced administrative 
burdens, greater accuracy in PWS generation, standardization 
in both MEO developments and intercommand CA program struc-
tures for synonymous CA functions. 
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C. POSITIONS AND PAY 
-
A continu ing concern of the federa l employees who 
perform CA studies is the effect the program has on civil 
service posit i ons and pay. 
As previously discussed, the coope ration of the 
functional manager and the federal employees who actually 
perform the service under study is vital t o the efficiency, 
success and compet itive level of the cost comparison effort . 
Lack of employee cooperation in this effort can result in 
loss of civil service grade positions a nd stagnation of 
individual pay scales . Employees who identify areas where 
reduced costs and greater efficiency may be achieved must 
face the fact that these efforts may negativ e l y affect their 
current position s and future monetary compensation. In-
house efforts at MEO developments normal ly result in a 
reduction of the activity's staff as tasks are more well-
defined and combined . CA program managers rely on foremen 
and supervisory personnel to assist in the developments of 
these more efficient organizations. The paradox for 
supervisory personnel is that their decis i ons and findings 
can result in a reduction of their own positions and a 
capping of their near-term income. Foremen and supervisors 
who effectivel y reduce costs through activ ities consolida-
tion realize that their own grade posit i on will also be 
reduced because of the reduction in overal l activity size . 
Concurrently, this reduction in position will not reduce his 
38 
or her base pay level because of "saved pay" entitlements. 
However, the employee will not be eligible for cost of 
living or annual federal pay increases during the two year 
saved pay time period. At the end of the two year period, 
the employee must assume a reduced grade position with a 
lower pay level. 
Clearly, CA program managers are skeptical about the 
efforts made by functional managers and employees in their 
assistance to develop a truly competitive MEO structure. 
The career civil servant is strained to provide maximum 
cooperation. The CA program is saddled with accusations of 
inequity in the treatment of federal employees. The program 
itself is not meeting its stated goals of efficiency in CA 
performance. PWS's and MEO's are not as streamlined or as 
cost efficient in structure as competitively possible. 
D. QUALITY OF WORK 
Supervisory personnel in government performed CA's fear 
that MEO development and implementation will cause a 
reduction in the quality of CA performance. They contend 
that there is a potential for loss of experienced personnel 
through grade reductions. These losses will occur in order 
to meet efficient and competitive bid levels. The 
reductions in grade level positions would allow less 
experienced individuals to perform the task. A less 
experienced workforce will evolve regardless of whether the 
CA was awarded to private contractors or retained in-house. 
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These movements and changes within the workforce as a 
result of CA studies create the following concerns: 
a. Loss of cor porate knowledge 
b. Reduced vested interest in performance 
c. Increased managerial and administrative burdens. 
E. RETIREMENT ANOMALY 
Most federal employees are concerned about the negative 
impact of CA program studies on their cont i nued employment. 
However, some employees use the CA program to gain an 
occupational advantage. Occurring on a limited scale, 
employees eligible for early or regular retirement will 
ascertain where and what positions will come under a CA cost 
comparison study. If these CA studies are not occurring 
within their host commands, they will attempt to transfer to 
commands whose CA's, compatible with thei r skills, are up 
for study. This effort allows the employee to gain federal 
retirement benefits while maintaining an advantageous 
position for receiving employment with a CA award-winning 
private contractor. 
In taking advantage of the right of first refusal CA 
policy, these employees add to the workforce perceptions of 
unfair and poorly-structured CA program guidelines. This 
type of manipulation is detrimental to the development of 
the Navy-wide CA program and a loyal product ive workforce. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. RESULTS 
The primary purpose of this thesis was to investigate 
the allegations raised by field level offices toward CA 
program policies. This was done through personal interviews 
and discussions with CA program offices in the Monterey and 
San Francisco Bay areas. The conclusion is that field level 
CA program managers hold a low regard for the stated program 
goals. The majority of CA managers in the field, who are 
relied upon to assure efficient performance of the CA 
program, believe current policies to be biased towards 
private industry. Areas of policy that led to this percep-
tion were the lack of individual role definitions, five year 
review requirements, lack of resource support, breakdown of 
in-house command structures and the failure to provide an 
incentive system for performance. 
Managers the author spoke with view current CA policy 
documents (i.e., OMB Circular A-76 and OP~AVINST 4860.7B) as 
the first attempt for establishing permanent methods and 
procedures for contracting out non-inherently governmental 
commercial activities. They believe it creates a situation 
allowing enormous potential for abuse, whereby managers and 
subordinates are encouraged not to strive for cost 
efficiency. 
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Federal and Navy officials must reaffirm the unbiased 
policy of -the CA program. Actions must be directed towards 
ensuring that federal employees compete based upon their 
most efficient organization. Contractors develop MEO's and 
compete based on the incentive of expected profits. In-
house organizations competition is not based on a sense of 
personal or organizational gain. Allowed to continue the CA 
program becomes , and is perceived as, a policy of in-house 
attrition vice fair competition. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1 . Managerial Roles 
Navy policy for conducting CA cost comparisons is 
based on cost efficiency and competition. Therefore, CA 
field managers working to provide an environment for economy 
and efficiency in cost comparisons, require strict role 
definitions. The following change to Reference 2, p. 1-9, 
Section 140.E.1 is recommended: 
Appoint a CA program manager to monitor, coordinate 
and implement the operation of the command's CA program. 
This manager will be responsible for the effi- c i e n t 
development of the in-house bid. 
This change effectively assigns the role of the CA 
manager to working for in-house efficiency. Managerial 
guidance should ensure in-house competitiveness and foster 
team efforts at all levels of the affected CA towards 





2. Incentive System/Review Requirements 
It is recommended that an incentive system and a 
change to review requirements as discussed in Chapter IV, 
Section B be provided. Through these changes potentially 
affected federal employees would still be allowed to assist 
in the development of the in-house bid. But, their involve-
ment would be more highly motivated due to the incentive of 
greater stability. CA program managers working in their new 
roles with foremen and senior activity supervisors will act 
as final authority for recommended wage and manpower levels. 
Allegations regarding changes to position and pay, as well 
as quality of work, would now be inapplicable. Program 
decisions on grade positions and pay levels would truly be 
an in-house function, subject to determination at the 
activity level. Quality of work allegations would subse-
quently be removed as activity personnel themselves become 
involved in final MEO and PWS determinations. 
The Navy's CA policy needs to provide equity in its 
treatment of both the federal and civilian parties partici-
pating in the program. Without equity in the conduct of the 
program towards the two generalized groups of players, the 
level of competition is degraded and the potential savings 
to the Government is decreased. Current CA policy and 
guidelines do not provide this equity, especially in its 
treatment of the federal employees. 
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C. AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
Further research in the following areas is recommended: 
1. Causes of poor contractor performance and cost over-
runs leading to terminations for defau lt. 
2. Development of data base reporting met hods of marginal 
contractor perf ormance. 
3. CA incentive system implementation to support the 
federal employee. 
4. Developing strategies and practices to enhance the 
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